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that effective collective security is built on a solid
foundation of American military capability and lead-
ership (Wolfowitz, 1994) then Russia is worrying
about the changing global equilibrium as well as the
Russian state, and the emerging security vacuums
around it (Lukin, 1994). Russian geopolitical thought
is based on the notion of cold-blooded national inter-
est rather than on any global idealism, accompanied
by the interests that were the basis of "new political
thinking" in the late Gorbatchev and early Yeltsin time.
Russia has not entirely given up an idea of restoring
itself as a great European power with major Asian
interests in a strategic alliance with the other coun-
tries of the Northern hemisphere. So far Russia has
not given up the notion that the disintegration of the
USSR and the formation on its territory of new states
had little if any historical legitimacy (Karaganov
1991). There is even an opinion that Russia should
use geopolitical suggestions in practice, so to say in
foreign policy design
(Sorokin 1996). If this
school of thought starts to
resemble the notorious in-
ter-war German Geopolitic
is open for discussion in the
future. However all the pre-
sumptions for the flourish-
ing of Realpolitik in Russia
are noticeable. The USA
and Russian geopolitical
thinking is not simply con-
flicting or the opposite to
each other, but rather repre-
sent different standpoints
within the framework of in-
ternational relation theories.
Thus, there is no wonder
why both sides do not eas-
ily find a common language
in the international arena.
Recent negotiations on
NATO enlargement and
Russia's involvement in the
decision-making process
showed less promising signs
for those who believe in uni-
versalism and a "new wave"
in Russian foreign policy.
Geopolitical codes are
This article will focus on the interpretation of
geopolitical codes, the way the political leaders name
places as more or less important, rank the world re-
gions and particular states in terms of "threats" to their
military and economic security or challenge to their
national interests. It is divided into three parts with
the emphasis on theoretical frameworks and current
geopolitical thought. When the first part defines the
nature of geopolitical reasoning then the second and
third part attempt to demonstrate it on the interna-
tional arena.
Geopolitical Codes
According to conventional definition, geopo-
litical codes are the set of strategic assumptions that a
government makes about other states in forming its
foreign policy. They are closely related to what
Henrikson (1980) calls' image plans' and common to
all the states in the world. Such operational codes in-
volve evaluation of places in
terms of their strategic im-
portance and as potential
threats. They tell about na-
tional interests and help to
justify states' foreign policy
through geopolitical reason-
ing. Geopolitical codes are
not just state-centric, they in-
volve a particular single
state's world view. They may
be ideological operations of
exclusion and demarcations,
which define "them" and
"their place" as "other" in
distinction to "us" and "our
place". In fact there has al-
ways been a hierarchy of in-
fluence within the inter-state
system whereby the most
powerful impose ideas and
assumptions on the less pow-
erful.
In global politics the
USA and Russia are in dif-
ferent ideological positions:
rang mg from neo-
Cominternism to neo-
Wilsonianism on the other
extreme. When USA judges
According to the conventional
definition, geopolitical codes are sets
of strategic assumptions that a
government makes about other
states in shaping its foreign policy. In
global politics the USA and Russia
are in different ideological positions:
ranging from neo-Cominternism to
neo-Wilsonianism on the other. When
the USA judges that effective
collective security is built on the solid
foundation of American military
capability and leadership, then
Russia is worrying about the
changing global equilibrium, as well
as the Russian state and the
emerging security vacuums around it.
The US and Russian geopolitical
thinking is not simply conflicting or
opposed to each other, but they
rather represent different standpoints.
Neither the United States nor Russia
has been a truly European power and
both have talked far more about their
missions than about their interests.
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best seen in foreign political doctrines with global and
regional scope. U.S. global geopolitical code was de-
fined in the White House paper issued in 1995, while
Russian regional code is easily followed in strategic
writings of 1991-96.
U.S. Global Geopolitical Code: Leadership
Through Engagement and Enlargement
National exceptionalism is the belief that one's
own country has a unique "mission" or "destiny" in
the world (Agnew 1983). In the case of American
exceptionalism, geopolitical codes cluster around two
basic claims: one, that America is a chosen place, a
distinct and exceptional "homeland" within the world
and that this place and those who live there have a
sacred mission and unique destiny within the world.
Second, it is argued that the United States spreads
only freedom and democracy abroad, in contrast to
other states, whose external policies promote their self-
interests. Both these geopolitical claims are part of
the ideology of American foreign policy that serves
globalist perspectives. This global code stresses the
importance and responsibility of the United States in
world affairs and is considered to be involved in most
if not all anti-American movements around the globe.
Thus all the places in the world are equally important
in the US foreign policy design but still some places
acquire more attention.
At the moment the USA is making attempts to
build a new world order. After the collapse of Soviet
Union its military might and truly global economy
has been unparalleled, making American leadership
more essential. There is a widely recognised opinion
that American assets like military strength, dynamic
economy, powerful ideals and people are unique. The
last national security strategy is focusing on new
threats and new opportunities and is premised on the
belief that the line between domestic and foreign poli-
cies is disappearing (A National Security ... 1995).
Opened foreign markets enable to create jobs for
American people, increase foreign trade and benefit
American nation. Democratic states are less likely to
threaten American interests and to enhance global
security the USA should initiate NATO's expansion
process. Thus the United States feels a responsibility
that goes along with being a super power, missionary
of democratic ideals and economic prosperity. Those
states opposing to democratic ideals and American
leadership are threats to the US national interests as
well as global security. Therefore, all Americans at
home or abroad have to work to deter would-be ag-
gressors, open foreign markets, promote the spread
of democracy and pursue new opportunities for peace.
US overseas presence is facing geopolitical reason-
ing like defending US interests in critical regions and
preventing the development of power vacuums and
threats to regional security. US global code seeks the
possibilities to make announcements in every time and
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place that in the post-Cold War era the USA is the
only exceptional nation to exercise world leadership
whose responsibility is to ensure its influence over
and participation in collective decision-making in a
wide and growing range of circumstances. The new
geopolitical code stresses the need to enlarge the US
leadership particularly in countries of geo-strategic
importance. US strategy of enlargement and engage-
ment is central to its policy towards post-Cold War
Europe. Here the goal is an integrated democratic
Europe co-operating with the United States under the
framework of NATO. The NATO will remain the an-
chor of American engagement in Europe and while
expanding the alliance to the East, it will leave no
space for great power competition.
Estonia and the whole Baltic region serves a
minor importance to the US national interests. We
can only shape under the third pillar of the US global
security concerns which means merely a development
of democratic institutions and free market economy.
We can even notice a considerable strategic shift if
we take a brief look in "Strategic Assessment" '95
and '97, published at the Institute for National Strate-
gic Studies. When the 1995 edition treated all the
Baltic states under the heading "Europe" then the 1997
edition prefers to group the Baltics together with Rus-
sia and CIS. Id depicts the Baltics as a conflict poten-
tial region because of its ethnic composition (large
Russian minority) and because Russia recognises the
independence of the Baltic states with certain reser-
vations. Russia may want to invade the Baltics to pro-
tect Russian minority and secure the accessibility to
the important sea ports. USA recognises a "Baltic
problem" because of the threat to European stability
and calls for risk reduction through improvement of
mutual relationships between the Baltics and Russia.
It is quite unlikely that all these details favour the




IrRussian Regional Geopolitical Code: "Leader-
ship Through Revival and Reorientation"
No idea is more central in Russian history than
the one that Russia has a special mission in the world
which is linked to Russian Orthodoxy and the ideas
of Third Rome. It was then transformed into the Marx-
ist vision that Russia could represent a special way to
the future. More recently it has been suggested that
Russia has a special role to play in bringing democ-
racy and free-market capitalism to the non-Russian
successor states. Russia and Russians have talked
much about loss and called for mission after the col-
lapse of Soviet Union. Many foreign political ana-
lysts have pointed to the shift from global to regional
geopolitical thinking and the importance of security
interests in the first place. For example, there is a grow-
ing fear that the successor states will either collapse
into violence that could spread to Russia or become
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footholds of states hostile to Russia (Globe, 1994).
The tendency towards neo-isolation is strength-
ened by geopolitical factors and emphasised by the
economic interests. In the dissolution of the USSR,
Russia lost most of the ports. Only about 20% of the
customs entry points are now on the territory of Rus-
sia. Eventually it will have to pay additional money
for the transfer of its goods abroad. Therefore the Bal-
tic ports serve an important role for Russian economy
without doubt.
There is a "Versailles syndrome", which is vis-
ibly growing among Russians. Most people were able
to adapt easily to the loss of the "external" empire,
withdrawal of the troops from East-Central Europe
and its diminishing role in world affairs. It is much
harder to adapt to the dissolution of the Soviet Union
itself which was inherited from the Russian Tzars and
renamed in 1721 as the Russian Empire. People are
fearing further disintegration and danger to the per-
sonal safety.
Russia's regional geopolitical code depicts the
emergence of security vacuums or gee-strategic gaps
where arms, political instability and the existence of
little regulatory machinery will draw in outside pow-
ers. NATO is rapidly penetrating into East-Central
Europe and trying to fill the security vacuum without
Russia. Russia is economically and geo-strategically
doomed to be a European power. Sergei Karaganov
(1991) has written that if it is locked out, sooner or
latter it will have to get in, or break in.
Historicaly, Russia's national interests and for-
eign relations have formed concentric circles (Travkin,
1994), Nowadays the first and innermost circle is re-
served for CIS and Baltic states, so called "Near
abroad" and the second or outer circle serves the rest
of the world, so called "Far abroad". There is a wide-
spread opinion that the whole Baltic area (also Esto-
nia) falls within Russian security area in the same way
as the Caribbean falls within the US security area. To
meet these concerns, Russia must have some basic
rights in the Baltic states and insists on that
(Kremenyuk, 1994). The Russian historical expansion
has created an image of the "Russian threat", which
has survived until recently and feeds anti-Russian feel-
ings in all neighbouring states. On the other hand, it
created a superpower feeling among the common Rus-
sian people. Russian political culture is based on the
veneration of power, on the belief that might decides
everything. "Near abroad" has crucial meaning in re-
gional geopolitical coding. Above-mentioned coun-
tries (sic! imagined region) have acquired top prior-
ity in Russian foreign policy design, since their sov-
ereignty and independence could be perceived by
some Russians as a threat, especially for compatriots,
living in those areas. In this regard, Russia is often
regarded as solely responsible for the state of affairs
in these independent states - it has to play the role of
guarantor of the public order, economic survival, de-
145
mocracy and defend the rights of Russian citizens
abroad. Russia has even declared willingness to use
all possible means, also military might if necessary
for securing its national interests in the "Near abroad".
Russia's primary mission is to provide leadership in
restoring regional integration and thus pave a way to
revival. Its regional geopolitical code expresses secu-
rity concerns, political and economic interests that are
diminishing with the distance from Moscow.
Neither the United States nor Russia has been
truly European power and both have talked far more
about mission than about interests. Many in both coun-
tries are undergoing acute withdrawal pains from the
weakening of their missionary role and are engaging
in both massive denial and search for enemies that
will justify remnants of the centuries old conceptions.
The same way as states like Libya and Iran behave
asymmetrically in the world of commonly accepted
rules and oppose the US global geopolitical code,
Estonia is not willing to recognise Russian regional
geopolitical code and domination in the Baltic area.
In this way Estonia has become an enemy to much
more powerful and one hundred times bigger Russia.
It's not fashionable to talk about "spheres of
influences" but instead of those "security areas" of
great powers. What we have heard about U.S. national
interests in the world arena sounds clearly different
compared to Russia's vital interests in the Baltics -
who else would defend those undeservedly insulted
and unjustly persecuted if not Russia itself? The state-
ment that German interests in the inter-war
Mitteleuropa and Russian interests in the post-Cold
War "Near abroad" are diametrically opposite, does
not hold up. Only geopolitical reasoning, the way how
territorial expansion, threats and opportunities, friends
and enemies are explained, really matters. The inter-
vention on behalf of 25 million ethnic Russians can
be used any time as a pretext for territorial expansion
towards "hostile" non-Russian successor states. Un-
fortunately, Estonia is one of these "hostile states".
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